Indian Olympic Association, New Delhi v. DIT(E), New Delhi

ITA 3501/DEL/2008 | misc
Pronouncement Date: 19-03-2010 | Result: Allowed

Appeal Details

RSA Number 350120114 RSA 2008
Assessee PAN APRIL2001I
Bench Delhi
Appeal Number ITA 3501/DEL/2008
Duration Of Justice 1 year(s) 3 month(s) 22 day(s)
Appellant Indian Olympic Association, New Delhi
Respondent DIT(E), New Delhi
Appeal Type Income Tax Appeal
Pronouncement Date 19-03-2010
Appeal Filed By Assessee
Order Result Allowed
Bench Allotted C
Tribunal Order Date 19-03-2010
Date Of Final Hearing 03-03-2010
Next Hearing Date 03-03-2010
Assessment Year misc
Appeal Filed On 27-11-2008
Judgment Text
IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL (DELHI BENCH C NEW DELHI) BEFORE SHRI RAJPAL YADAV AND SHRI SHAMIM YAHYA I.T.A. NO. 3501/DEL/2008 ASST.YEAR: 2002-03 I.T.A. NO. 3500/DEL/2008 - - INDIAN OLYMPIC ASSOCIATION VS. ASSISTANT DIRE CTOR OF IT (EXM.) B-29- QUTAB INSTITUTIONAL AREA TRUST CIRCLE-II NEW DELHI-1100 06 NEW DELHI. (APPELLANT) (RESPONDENT) I.T.A. NO. 3703/DEL/2008 ASST.YEAR: 2002-03 DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF IT (EXM.) VS. INDIAN OLYMP IC ASSOCIATION TRUST CIRCLE-II JAWAHAR LAL NEHRU STADIUM NEW DELHI-1100 06 GATE NO.25 LODHI ROAD NEW DELHI. (APPELLANT) (RESPONDENT) DEPARTMENT BY: SHRI HIREN MEHTA CA ASSESSEE BY: SMT. MONA MOHANTY SR . DR ORDER PER RAJPAL YADAV: JUDICIAL MEMBER ITA NOS. 3500 & 3703/DEL/08 ARE DIRECTED AT THE IN STANCE OF THE REVENUE AS WELL AS ASSESSEE AGAINST THE ORDER OF LE ARNED CIT(APPEALS) DATED 22.9.2008 PASSED FOR ASSESSMENT YEAR 2002-03. THESE APPEALS HAVE BEEN EMANATED FROM ASSESSMENT ORDER DATED 17.12.2007 PAS SED UNDER SEC. 143(3) 2 READ WITH SEC. 147 OF THE INCOME-TAX ACT 1961. ITA NO.3501/DEL/08 IS DIRECTED AT THE INSTANCE OF THE ASSESSEE AGAINST TH E ORDER OF DIRECTOR OF INCOME-TAX (EXEMPTION) DATED 20.8.2002 PASSED UNDER SEC. 12AA OF THE INCOME-TAX ACT 1961. 2. FIRST WE TAKE ITA NO.3501/DEL/08. THE GRIEVANCE OF THE ASSESSEE IN THIS APPEAL IS THAT LEARNED DIRECTOR OF INCOME-TAX (EXEMPTION) HAS ERRED IN GRANTING REGISTRATION TO THE ASSESSEE W.E.F. 27.2.2 002 INSTEAD OF IST OF APRIL 2001 I.E. FROM THE DAY WHEN FINANCIAL YEAR COMMENCE D. THIS APPEAL HAS BEEN POINTED AS TIME BARRED BY THE REGISTRY BY ALMO ST SIX YEARS. THE ASSESSEE HAS FILED AN APPLICATION FOR CONDONATION O F DELAY. 3. THE BRIEF FACTS OF THE CASE AS EMERGING OUT FROM THE ORDER DATED 20.8.2002 PASSED UNDER SEC. 12AA THE ASSESSEE IS A SPORTS ASSOCIATION CALLED INDIAN OLYMPIC ASSOCIATION AND CAME INTO EXISTENC E ON 27.6.1965 AS DISCERNIBLE FROM THE MEMORANDUM OF ASSOCIATION. ACC ORDING TO THE ASSESSEE IT IS AN APEX SPORTS BODY IN INDIA WHICH REPRESENTS THE COUNTRY AND IS A MEMBER OF OLYMPIC ASSOCIATION. THE DIFFERE NT SPORTS ASSOCIATIONS IN THE COUNTRY ARE THE MEMBERS/AFFILIATE OF THE IND IAN OLYMPIC ASSOCIATION. THE MAIN ACTIVITY OF THE ASSOCIATION IS TO ORGANIZE SUPPORTS ACTIVITIES UNDER AEGIS OF MINISTRY OF YOUTH AFFAIRS & SPORTS GOVERN MENT OF INDIA AND 3 INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC ASSOCIATION IN INDIA APART F ROM ORGANIZING VARIOUS NATIONAL LEVEL GAMES AS WELL AS ORGANIZING/PARTICIP ATING OF ATHLETES AND SPORTS PERSONS IN VARIOUS INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION NAMELY ASSOCIATION GAMES COMMON WEALTH GAMES WINTER GAMES ETC. THUS THE ASSOCIATION IS RESPONSIBLE FOR ORGANIZING PARTICIPATION AND SPREA DING THE AWARENESS OF SPORTS IN THE COUNTRY WHICH IS FULLY FUNDED FROM GR ANT FROM THE MINISTRY OF YOUTH AFFAIRS AND SPORTS GOVERNMENT OF INDIA. THE ASSESSEE WAS ENJOYING EXEMPTION UNDER SEC. 10(23) VIDE NOTIFICATION DATED 16.4.1999 FOR A PERIOD OF ASSESSMENT YEAR 1998-99 TO 2000-01. THE ASSESSEE HAD FILED RENEWAL APPLICATION FOR EXEMPTION UNDER SEC. 10(23) IN FORM NO.55 ON 8 TH JULY 2001. IT HAS BEEN PLEADED BY THE ASSESSEE THAT SINCE SEC. 10(23) OF THE ACT WAS OMITTED BY THE FINANCE ACT 2002 W.E.F. 1.4.2003 T HE STATUS OF THE APPLICATION FILED WAS NOT KNOWN TO THE ASSESSEE AND THE SAME WAS ALSO NOT PURSUED BY THE ASSESSEE IN VIEW OF THE OMISSION OF SEC. 10(23) OF THE ACT. HOWEVER THE ASSESSEE WAS ENTITLED TO BENEFIT OF EX EMPTION UNDER SEC. 10(23) TILL 31.3.2002. AFTER THE OMISSION OF SEC. 10(23) ASSESSEE WAS REQUIRED TO OBTAIN A REGISTRATION UNDER SEC. 12A OF THE ACT. IT HAS APPLIED FOR SUCH REGISTRATION ON 27.2.02. THE REGISTRATION HAS BEEN GRANTED BY THE DIRECTOR OF INCOME-TAX (EXEMPTION) VIDE ORDER DATED 20.8.2002 HOWEVER SUCH 4 REGISTRATION HAS BEEN GRANTED W.E.F. 27.2.2002. THE LEARNED COUNSEL FOR THE ASSESSEE AT THE TIME OF HEARING POINTED OUT THAT AS PER SEC. 12A OF THE ACT THE REGISTRATION IS TO BE GRANTED EITHER FROM THE D ATE OF CREATION OF THE TRUST OR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE INSTITUTION IF THE COMMISS IONER IS FOR REASONS TO BE RECORDED IN WRITING SATISFIED WITH THE PERSON IN R ECEIPT OF THE INCOME WAS PREVENTED FROM MAKING THE APPLICATION BEFORE THE EX PIRY OF THE PERIOD AFORESAID FOR SUFFICIENT REASONS. OTHERWISE AS PER SUB-CLAUSE (2) REGISTRATION IS TO BE GRANTED FROM THE IST DAY OF THE FINANCIAL YEAR IN WHICH THE APPLICATION IS MADE. THUS THE CONDITIONS ENUMERATE D IN SEC. 12A MAKE IT CLEAR THAT IF AN ASSESSEE IS ABLE TO EXPLAIN THE RE ASONS FOR NOT FILING THE APPLICATION IN TIME AND THE COMMISSIONER IS SATISFI ED THEN HE CAN GRANT REGISTRATION W.E.F. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE TRUST OR INSTITUTION OTHERWISE HE WILL GRANT THE REGISTRATION FROM THE IST DAY OF THE FINANCIAL YEAR IN WHICH THE APPLICATION IS MADE. IN THE PRESENT CASE ASSESSEE HAS MADE THE APPLICATION ON 27.2.2002 THE REGISTRATION OUGHT TO HAVE BEEN G RANTED W.E.F. IST OF APRIL 2001 I.E. THE IST DAY OF THE FINANCIAL YEAR. SINCE THE REGISTRATION WAS GRANTED TO THE ASSESSEE IT FAILED TO TAKE NOTICE OF THE DA Y FROM WHICH THE REGISTRATION HAS BEEN GRANTED. IT REMAINED UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT IT WAS ENJOYING THE EXEMPTION UNDER SEC. 10(23) IT WILL CONTINUE TO EN JOY THE BENEFIT UNDER 5 SECTIONS 11 AND 12 AS THE REGISTRATION HAS BEEN GRA NTED TO IT. IT ONLY CAME TO KNOW ABOUT THIS DEFECT WHEN ASSESSING OFFICER HAD I SSUED A NOTICE FOR REASSESSMENT. IT REMAINED UNDER THE BELIEF THAT EFF ECT OF REGISTRATION WOULD BE GIVEN FROM THE IST DAY OF THE FINANCIAL YEAR AS CONTEMPLATED IN THE LAW. HOWEVER THE LEARNED REVENUE AUTHORITIES DID NOT CO NCEDE TO THE REQUEST OF THE ASSESSEE AND THEREFORE IT BECAME NECESSARY FO R THE ASSESSEE TO CHALLENGE THE ORDER OF DIRECTOR OF INCOME-TAX (EXEMPTION) IN APPEAL. THE DELAY IN FILING THE APPEAL WAS NOT INTENTIONAL RATHER DUE TO A BONA FIDE BELIEF. THE ASSESSEE IS NOT GOING TO GET ANY BENEFIT BY FILING THE APPEAL AFTER EXPIRY OF TIME. IT DID NOT FILE THE APPEAL BECAUSE IN ITS OPI NION IT WOULD GET THE BENEFIT UNDER SEC. 11 AND 12 OF THE ACT. 4. LEARNED DR ON THE OTHER HAND OPPOSED THE PRAYER OF THE ASSESSEE. SHE POINTED OUT THAT ASSESSEE SHOULD BE VIGILANT IN PRO SECUTING ITS REMEDY. IT SHOULD HAVE FILED THE APPEAL WHEN REGISTRATION WAS RECEIVED BY IT. 5. WE HAVE CONSIDERED THE RIVAL CONTENTIONS. THE CO URTS AND THE QUASI- JUDICIAL BODIES ARE EMPOWERED TO CONDONE THE DELAY IF A LITIGANT SATISFIES THE COURT THAT THERE WERE SUFFICIENT REASONS FOR AVAILI NG THE REMEDY AFTER EXPIRY OF THE LIMITATION. SUCH REASONING SHOULD BE TO THE SATISFACTION OF THE COURT. THE EXPRESSION SUFFICIENT CAUSE OR REASON AS PROV IDED IN SUB-S(5) OF 6 SEC.253 SUB-SECTION (3) OF SEC. 249 OF THE IT ACT I S USED IN IDENTICAL POSITION IN OTHER SECTIONS OF THE IT ACT SUCH AS SS.274 273 ETC. THE EXPRESSION SUFFICIENT CAUSE WITHIN THE MEANING OF SEC.5 OF T HE LIMITATION ACT AS WELL AS SIMILAR OTHER PROVISIONS THE AMBIT OF EXERCISE OF POWERS THEREUNDER HAVE BEEN SUBJECT MATTER OF CONSIDERATION BEFORE THE HON 'BLE SUPREME COURT ON VARIOUS OCCASIONS. IN THE CASE OF STATE OF WEST BEN GAL VS. THE ADMINISTRATOR HOWRAH MUNICIPALITY AIR 1972 S.C. 74 9 THE HON'BLE SUPREME COURT WHILE CONSIDERING THE SCOPE OF EXPRES SION SUFFICIENT CAUSE FOR CONDONATION OF DELAY HAS HELD THAT THE SAID EXP RESSION SHOULD RECEIVE A LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION SO AS TO ADVANCE THE SUBSTANTI AL JUSTICE WHEN NO NEGLIGENCE OR INACTION OR WANT OF BONA FIDE IS IMPU TABLE TO PARTY. 6. IN THE CASE OF N. BALAKRISHNAN VS. M. KRISHNAMUR THY AIR 1998 S.C. 3222 THERE WAS A DELAY OF 883 DAYS IN FILING AN AP PLICATION FOR SETTING ASIDE THE EX PARTE DECREE FOR WHICH APPLICATION FOR CONDO NATION OF DELAY WAS FILED. THE TRIAL COURT HAVING FOUND THAT SUFFICIENT CAUSE WAS MADE OUT FOR CONDONATION OF DELAY CONDONED THE DELAY. HOWEVER T HE HON'BLE HIGH COURT REVERSED THE ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT. HON'BLE SUPR EME COURT WHILE RESTORING THE ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT HAS OBSERVED IN PARAS 8 9 AND 10 AS UNDER: 9. THE APPELLANTS CONDUCT DOES NOT ON THE WHOLE W ARRANT TO CASTIGATE HIM AS AN IRRESPONSIBLE LITIGANT. WHAT HE DID IN DEFENDING THE 7 SUIT WAS NOT VERY MUCH FAR FROM WHAT A LITIGANT WOU LD BROADLY DO. OF COURSE IT MAY BE SAID THAT HE SHOULD HAVE BEEN MOR E VIGILANT BY VISITING HIS ADVOCATE AT SHORT INTERVALS TO CHECK U P THE PROGRESS OF THE LITIGATION. BUT DURING THESE DAYS WHEN EVERYBODY IS FULLY OCCUPIED WITH HIS OWN AVOCATION OF LIFE AN OMISSION TO ADOPT SUCH EXTRA VIGILANCE NEED NOT BE USED AS GROUND TO DEPICT HIM AS A LITIGANT NOT AWARE OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES AND TO VISIT HIM WIT H DRASTIC CONSEQUENCES. 9. IT IS AXIOMATIC THAT CONDONATION OF DELAY IS A M ATTER OF DISCRETION OF THE COURT. SEC.5 OF THE LIMITATION AC T DOES NOT SAY THAT SUCH DISCRETION CAN BE EXERCISED ONLY IF THE DELAY IS WITHIN A CERTAIN LIMIT. LENGTH OF DELAY IS NO MATTER ACCEPTABILITY OF THE EXPLANATION IS THE ONLY CRITERION. SOMETIMES DELAY OF THE SHORTEST RANGE MAY BE UNCONDONABLE DUE TO A WANT OF ACCEPTABLE EXPLANATIO N WHEREAS IN CERTAIN OTHER CASES DELAY OF A VERY LONG RANGE CAN BE CONDONED AS THE EXPLANATION THEREOF IS SATISFACTORY. ONCE THE COURT ACCEPTS THE EXPLANATION AS SUFFICIENT IT IS THE RESULT OF POSI TIVE EXERCISE OF DISCRETION AND NORMALLY THE SUPERIOR COURT SHOULD N OT DISTURB SUCH FINDING MUCH LESS IN REVISIONAL JURISDICTION UNLE SS THE EXERCISE OF DISCRETION WAS ON WHOLLY UNTENABLE GROUNDS OR ARBIT RARY OR PERVERSE. BUT IT IS A DIFFERENT MATTER WHEN THE FIRST COURT R EFUSES TO CONDONE THE DELAY. IN SUCH CASES THE SUPERIOR COURT WOULD BE F REE TO CONSIDER THE CAUSE SHOWN FOR THE DELAY AFRESH AND IN ITS OWN FIN DING EVEN UNTRAMMELED BY THE CONCLUSION OF THE LOWER COURT. 10. 8 THE PRIMARY FUNCTION OF A COURT IS TO ADJUDICATE TH E DISPUTE BETWEEN THE PARTIES AND TO ADVANCE SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE. THE TIME-LIMIT FIXED FOR APPROACHING THE COURT IN DIFFERENT SITUATIONS IS NO T BECAUSE ON THE EXPIRY OF SUCH TIME A BAD CAUSE WOULD TRANSFORM INT O A GOOD CAUSE. (EMPHASIS ITALICIZED IN PRINT ADDED) THE HON'BLE SUPREME COURT FURTHER OBSERVED THAT RUL ES OF LIMITATION ARE NOT MEANT TO DESTROY THE RIGHTS OF THE PARTIES. THEY ARE MEANT TO SEE THAT PARTIES DO NOT RESORT TO DILATORY TACTICS BUT SEEK THE REMEDY PROMPTLY. THE HONBLE COURT FURTHER OBSERVED THAT R EFUSAL TO CONDONE THE DELAY WOULD RESULT IN FORECLOSING A SUITOR FROM PUTTING FORTH HIS CAUSE. THERE IS NO PRESUMPTION THAT DELAY IN APPROA CHING THE COURT IS ALWAYS DELIBERATE. THE HON'BLE SUPREME COURT IN SLP (CIVIL NO. 12980 OF 1986 DECIDED ON 19 TH FEB. 1987 IN THE CASE OF COLLECTOR LAND ACQUISITION & ORS. VS. MST. KATIJI & ORS. [REP ORTED AT (1987) 62 CTR (SYN) 23 (S.C) HAS LAID DOWN THE FOLLOWING GUID ELINES: 1. ORDINARILY A LITIGANT DOES NOT STAND TO BENEFIT BY LODGING AN APPEAL LATE. 2. REFUSAL TO CONDONE DELAY CAN RESULT IN A MERITORIOU S MATTER BEING THROWN OUT AT THE VERY THRESHOLD AND CAUSE OF JUSTICE BEING DEFEATED. AS AGAINST THIS WHEN DELAY IS CONDO NED THE HIGHEST THEN CAN HAPPEN IS THAT A CAUSE WOULD BE DE CIDED ON MERITS AFTER HEARING THE PARTIES. 3. EVERY DAYS DELAY MUST BE EXPLAINED DOES NOT MEAN THAT A PEDANTIC APPROACH SHOULD BE MADE WHY NOT EVERY HOU RS DELAY 9 EVERY SECONDS DELAY. THE DOCTRINE MUST BE APPLIED ON A RATIONAL COMMONSENSE PRAGMATIC MANNER. 4. WHEN SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE AND TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIO NS ARE PITTED AGAINST EACH OTHER CAUSE OF SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE DE SERVES TO BE PREFERRED FOR THE OTHER SIDE CANNOT CLAIM TO HAVE VESTED RIGHT IN INJUSTICE BEING DONE BECAUSE OF A NON-DELIBER4ATE D ELAY. 5. THERE IS NO PRESUMPTION THAT DELAY IS OCCASIONED DE LIBERATELY OR ON ACCOUNT OF CULPABLE NEGLIGENCE OR ON ACCOUNT OF MALA FIDES. A LITIGANT DOES NOT STAND TO BENEFIT BY RESO RTING TO DELAY. IN FACT HE RUNS A SERIOUS RISK. 6. IT MUST BE GRASPED THAT JUDICIARY IS RESPECTED NOT ON ACCOUNT OF ITS POWER TO LEGALIZE INJUSTICE ON TECHNICAL GROUND S BUT BECAUSE IT IS CAPABLE OF REMOVING INJUSTICE AND IS EXPECTED TO SO. MAKING A JUSTICE-ORIENTED APPROACH FROM THIS PERSPE CTIVE; THERE WAS SUFFICIENT CAUSE FOR CONDONING THE DELAY IN THE INS TITUTION OF THE APPEAL. THE FACT THAT IT WAS THE STATE WHICH WAS SEEKING CONDONATION AND NOT A PRIVATE PARTY WAS ALTOGETHER IRRELEVANT. 7. KEEPING IN MIND THE ABOVE AUTHORITATIVE PRONOUNC EMENT OF THE HON'BLE SUPREME COURT IF WE ADVERT TO THE FACTS OF THE PRESENT CASE THEN IT WOULD REVEAL THAT EXPLANATION OF THE ASSESSEE DOES NOT SMACK MALA FIDE OR DOES NOT PUT FORTH AS A DIATATORY STRATEGY. IT MUST BE REMEMBERED THAT IN EVERY CASE OF DELAY THERE CAN BE SOME LAPSE ON THE PART OF THE LITIGANT CONCERNED BUT THAT ALONE IS NOT ENOUGH TO TURN DOWN THE PLEA AND TO SHUT THE 10 DOOR AGAINST THE ASSESSEE. AS OBSERVED BY THE HON'B LE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF N. BALAKRISHAN (SUPRA) THE LENGTH OF DELAY IS IMMATERIAL IT IS ACCEPTABILITY OF THE EXPLANATION I.E. THE ONLY CRIT ERIA FOR CONDONING THE DELAY. THE ASSESSEE IS AN APEX SPORTS BODY IN INDIA WHICH REPRESENTS THE COUNTRY AND IS A MEMBER OF OLYMPIC ASSOCIATION. THE DIFFERE NT SPORTS ASSOCIATION IN THE COUNTRY ARE THE MEMBER/AFFILIATES OF THE ASSESS EE. IT HAS BEEN ENJOYING BENEFIT OF SEC. 10(23) AND ITS INCOME WAS EXEMPTED IN THE PAST. IT IS RECEIVING THE GRANTS MAINLY FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA. AFTER OMISSION OF SEC. 10(23) IT HAS DULY APPLIED FOR GRANT OF REGIS TRATION UNDER SEC. 12A OF THE ACT. AS PER THE CONDITIONS PROVIDED IN THE SEC.12A THE REGISTRATION COULD BE GRANTED EITHER W.E.F. THE ESTABLISHED OF THE INSTIT UTION IF THE COMMISSIONER IS SATISFIED THAT THE ASSESSEE WAS PREVENTED BY SUFFIC IENT REASON FOR NOT MAKING APPLICATION IN TIME. IF THE LEARNED CIT IS NOT SATI SFIED WITH THE REASONS SHOWN BY THE ASSESSEE THEN THE REGISTRATION WOULD B E GRANTED FROM THE FIRST DAY OF THE FINANCIAL YEAR IN WHICH THE APPLICATION IS MADE. IN THE CASE OF THE ASSESSEE APPLICATION WAS MADE ON 27.2.2002. IT HAS BEEN ACCEPTED BY THE LEARNED CIT THE ORDER PASSED UNDER SEC. 12A IS ON A PRINTED PROFORMA. IN COLUMN NO.6 THE LEARNED CIT HAS MENTIONED THAT REG ISTRATION UNDER SEC. 12A READ WITH SEC. 12AA(1)(B) OF THE ACT IS ACCORDI NGLY HEREBY GRANTED 11 W.E.F. 27.2.2002. THERE IS NO REASON DISCERNIBLE HO W HE HAS CUT OF ONE ASSESSMENT YEAR IN TWO PARTS. FROM THIS ORDER IT I S NOT DISCERNIBLE WHETHER LEARNED CIT HAS TAKEN COGNIZANCE OF SEC. 12A SUB-CL AUSE (1) AND (2) BEFORE FILING THIS DATE 27.2.2002. IF ANY ONE WOULD CONSID ER THIS ORDER ALONG WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SEC. 12A COUPLED WITH THE PAST HI STORY OF THE ASSESSEE THAT IT WAS ENJOYING BENEFIT UNDER SEC. 10(23) THEN ONE MAY HARBOUR A BELIEF THAT ITS INCOME WOULD BE EXEMPTED FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR STARTING FROM IST OF APRIL 2001 UP TO 31 ST MARCH 2002. THE PROBLEM ARISES WHEN ASSESSING OFFICER AS WELL AS LEARNED CIT(APPEALS) HAD GIVEN A STRICT INTERPRETATION TO THE REGISTRATION GRANTED BY THE CIT. AT THAT STAGE ASSESSEE FELT THE NECESSITY TO CHALLENGE THE ORDER OF THE DIRECTOR OF INCOME-TA X (EXEMPTION) IN APPEAL. TO OUR MIND THERE IS NO INTENTIONAL NEGLIGENCE AT THE END OF THE ASSESSEE IN PROSECUTING ITS REMEDY. HON'BLE SUPREME COURT IN TH E CASE OF NAND KISHORE VS. STATE OF PUNJAB REPORTED IN (1985) VOL. VI SCC PAGE 614 HAS CONDONED A DELAY OF 31 YEARS ON PROCEDURAL ASPECT AND IN THA T CASE ALSO THE APPELLANT NAND KISHORE DID NOT CHALLENGE THE ORIGINAL ORDER E FFECTING HIS RIGHTS. TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION ALL THESE FACTORS WE CON DONE THE DELAY IN FILING THE APPEAL AND ALLOW IT ON MERITS ALSO. WE MODIFY T HE ORDER OF THE DIRECTOR ]\OF INCOME-TAX (EXEMPTION) THE REGISTRATION IS HE LD TO BE GRANTED FROM IST 12 OF APRIL 2001 I.E. FIRST DAY OF FINANCIAL YEAR IN WHICH APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION HAS BEEN MADE. WE ARE GRANTING THIS RE GISTRATION TO THE ASSESSEE BECAUSE AS FAR AS OTHER CONDITIONS ARE CONCERNED D IRECTOR OF INCOME-TAX (EXEMPTION) HAS NOT DOUBTED. IN OUR OPINION LEARNE D CIT HAS FAILED TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF SEC. 12A CLAUSE (1)(II) OF THE ACT. 8. NOW WE TAKE ITA NO.3500 & 3703/DEL/08. THESE AR E THE CROSS- APPEALS AT THE INSTANCE OF BOTH THE PARTIES. IN THE APPEAL OF THE ASSESSEE IT HAS PLEADED THAT BENEFIT OF EXEMPTION UNDER SEC. 11 IS TO BE GRANTED TO IT FROM IST OF APRIL 2001 INSTEAD OF 26.2.2002 GRANTE D BY THE ASSESSING OFFICER. THE REVENUE IN ITS APPEAL HAD PLEADED THAT LEARNED CIT HAS ERRED IN DELETING THE DISALLOWANCE OF EXPENSES FOR THE PERIO D IST OF APRIL 2001 UP TO 26.2.2002. ACCORDING TO THE REVENUE ASSESSEE WAS N OT HAVING REGISTRATION FOR THIS PERIOD AND THEREFORE BENEFIT OF SEC. 11 WILL NOT BE AVAILABLE TO THE ASSESSEE AND IT CANNOT CLAIM DEDUCTION OF EXPENSES. SIMILARLY IN GROUND NO.2 REVENUE HAS CHALLENGED THE DELETION OF RS.25 LACS RECEIVED BY THE ASSESSEE AS CONTRIBUTION FROM SPORTS AUTHORITY OF A ANDHRA PRADESH. SINCE WE HAVE UPHELD THE GRANT OF REGISTRATION FROM IST O F APRIL 2001 ALL THESE ISSUES ARE REQUIRED TO BE EXAMINED AFRESH IN VIEW OF OUR FINDINGS GIVEN ON 13 THE APPEAL OF ASSESSEE IN ITA NO. 3501/DEL/08 (SUPR A). THEREFORE WE ALLOW BOTH THESE APPEALS OF ASSESSEE AND REVENUE FOR STAT ISTICAL PURPOSES. 9. WE SUMMARIZE THE RESULT AS UNDER: 1. ITA NO. 3501/DEL/08 APPEAL OF THE ASSESSEE IS ALL OWED. 2. ITA NOS. 3500 AND 3703/DEL/08 APPEAL OF THE REVEN UE AND ASSESSEE ALLOWED FOR STATISTICAL PURPOSES. DECISION PRONOUNCED IN THE OPEN COURT ON 19.03.201 0 ( SHAMIM YAHYA ) ( RAJPAL Y ADAV ) ACCOUNTANT MEMBER JUDICIAL MEMBER DATED: 19/03/2010 MOHAN LAL COPY FORWARDED TO: 1. APPELLANT 2. RESPONDENT 3. CIT 4. CIT(A) 5. DR:ITAT ASSISTANT REGISTRAR