LAXMIBEN M. PALIWAL, MUMBAI v. I.T.O. WD 18(1)(2), MUMBAI

ITA 4529/MUM/2012 | 2006-2007
Pronouncement Date: 31-07-2015 | Result: Allowed

Appeal Details

RSA Number 452919914 RSA 2012
Assessee PAN ACFPP7966D
Bench Mumbai
Appeal Number ITA 4529/MUM/2012
Duration Of Justice 3 year(s) 26 day(s)
Appellant LAXMIBEN M. PALIWAL, MUMBAI
Respondent I.T.O. WD 18(1)(2), MUMBAI
Appeal Type Income Tax Appeal
Pronouncement Date 31-07-2015
Appeal Filed By Assessee
Order Result Allowed
Bench Allotted A
Tribunal Order Date 31-07-2015
Date Of Final Hearing 29-07-2015
Next Hearing Date 29-07-2015
Assessment Year 2006-2007
Appeal Filed On 04-07-2012
Judgment Text
IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL MUMBAI BENCH A MUMBAI BEFORE SHRI G.S. PANNU ACCOUNTANT MEMBER AND SHRI SANJAY GARG JUDICIAL MEMBER ITA NO.4529/M/2012 ASSESSMENT YEAR: 2006-07 SMT. LAXMIBAI M. PALIWAL 101/103 LAXMI MATCHING CHHATRIWALA CHAWL ELPHISTON ROAD MUMBAI 400 025. PAN: ACFPP 7966D VS. ITO WD 18(1)(2) MUMBAI (APPELLANT) (RESPONDENT) PRESENT FOR: ASSESSEE BY : SHRI MANISH J. SHETH A.R. REVENUE BY : SHRI S.P. WALIMBE D.R. DATE OF HEARING : 29.07.2015 DATE OF PRONOUNCEMENT : 31.07.2015 O R D E R PER SANJAY GARG JUDICIAL MEMBER: THE PRESENT APPEAL HAS BEEN PREFERRED BY THE ASSES SEE AGAINST THE ORDER DATED 07.01.2011 OF THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX (APPEALS) [(HEREINAFTER REFERRED TO AS CIT(A)] RELEVANT TO ASSESSMENT YEAR 2006-07. HOWEVER THIS APPEAL IS BARRED BY LIMITATION OF 170 DAYS. THE AS SESSEE HAS FILED A PETITION FOR CONDONATION OF DELAY WHEREIN IT HAS BEEN PLEADED TH AT THE ASSESSEE BEING A LADY IS NOT AWARE OF THE INTRICACIES OF THE LAW. THE OR DER OF THE LD. CIT(A) WAS RECEIVED BY THE STAFF MEMBER AT ASSESSEES SHOP AND HE DID NOT INFORM THE ASSESSEE ABOUT THE RECEIPT OF THE SAME. THE ASSESS EE WAS UNDER BONAFIDE BELIEF THAT THE ORDER OF THE LD. CIT(A) HAD NOT BEEN PASSE D. WHEN THE ASSESSEE CAME TO KNOW THAT THE ORDER HAD BEEN PASSED BY THE LD. C IT(A) SHE IMMEDIATELY APPROACHED HER AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE AND INQUIR ED ABOUT THE MATTER AND PROMPTLY FILED THE APPEAL. IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE SU BMISSIONS MADE BY THE ITA NO.4529/M/2012 SMT. LADMIBAI M. PALIWAL 2 ASSESSEE WE CONDONE THE DELAY OF 170 DAYS IN FILIN G THE PRESENT APPEAL AND PROCEED TO DECIDE THE APPEAL ON MERITS. 2. THE ASSESSEE HAS TAKEN THE FOLLOWING GROUNDS OF APPEAL: GROUND I : SALE OF RURAL AGRICULTURAL LAND LONG TERM CAPITAL GAIN ON SALE OF RURAL AGRICULTURA L LAND AMOUNTING TO RS. 7 45 079/- IS EXEMPT AS IT IS NOT A CAPITAL ASSET A S PER THE DEFINITION OF CAPITAL ASSET U/S. 2(14). WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE ABOVE GROUND II: DISALLOWANCE OF DEDUCTION U/S. 54EC ON THE FACTS AND IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE THE LEARNED COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX (APPEALS) ERRED IN UPHOL DING ORDER PASSED U/S 143(3) OF THE ACT BY THE LEARNED ASSESSING OFFICER DISALLOWING DEDUCTION U/S 54EC ON THE GROUND THAT THERE IS AN ADMITTED DELAY OF 24 DAYS OR MORE IN INVESTING IN NABARD BONDS. THE APPELLANT PRAYS THAT THE DEDUCTION U/S 54EC BE ALLOWED AS THERE IS NO DELAY IN INVESTING IN NABARD BONDS AS THE PERIOD OF SIX M ONTHS IS RECKONED FROM THE END OF THE MONTH IN WHICH THE TRANSFER TAKES PL ACE. THUS THE INVESTMENT IS MADE WITHIN THE STIPULATED TIME. GROUND III: THE APPELLANT CRAVES LEAVE TO ADD TO ALTER AND/OR AMEND THE ABOVE GROUNDS AT THE TIME OF HEARING. 3. THE BRIEF FACTS OF THE CASE ARE THAT THE ASSESSE E HAD SOLD ITS LAND FOR A TOTAL CONSIDERATION OF RS.1 0 12 500/- . THE ASSESS EE HAD DISCLOSED THE LONG TERM CAPITAL GAINS OF RS.745079/- ON SALE OF LAND A FTER AVAILING THE INDEXATION BENEFIT. THE ASSESSEE MADE INVESTMENT OF RS.5LAKH IN NABARD BONDS AND CLAIMED EXEMPTION UNDER SECTION 54EC OF THE INCOME TAX ACT. 4. THE ASSESSING OFFICER (HEREINAFTER REFERRED TO A S THE AO) HOWEVER NOTICED THAT THE INVESTMENT OF RS.5 LAKH WAS NOT MA DE WITHIN SIX MONTHS FROM THE DATE OF TRANSFER. HE THEREFORE DENIED THE EX EMPTION CLAIMED UNDER SECTION 54EC. ITA NO.4529/M/2012 SMT. LADMIBAI M. PALIWAL 3 5. IN APPEAL THE LD. CIT(A) CONFIRMED THE FINDING OF THE AO THAT AS PER THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 54EC THE INVESTMENT HAD TO BE MADE IN CAPITAL GAIN BONDS WITHIN SIX MONTHS FROM THE DATE OF TRANSFER OF THE PROPERTY. AGGRIEVED BY THE ORDER OF THE LD. CIT(A) THE ASSESSEE HAS COME IN A PPEAL BEFORE US. 6. THE LD. A.R. OF THE ASSESSEE HAS NOT ADDRESSED A NY ARGUMENT IN RELATION TO GROUND NO. 1 OF THE APPEAL. WE FIND THAT EVEN BE FORE THE LD. CIT(A) ALSO THE ASSESSEE HAD NOT SUBMITTED ANY EVIDENCE TO THE EFFECT THAT THE LAND SOLD WAS AN AGRICULTURAL LAND. THE GROUND NO. 1 IS THEREFORE DISMISSED. 7. IN RELATION TO GROUND NO. 2 OF THE APPEAL THE LD. AR HAS SUBMITTED THAT THE INVESTMENT UNDER SECTION 54EC OF THE ACT WAS MA DE ON 24.03.2006 (AS PER AO 27.3.2006) AGAINST THE TRANSFER OF CAPITAL ASSET AFFECTED ON 01.09.05 AND THAT AS PER THE DECISION OF THE SPECIAL BENCH OF TH E TRIBUNAL IN THE CASE OF ALKABEN B. PATEL ITA NO. 1973/AHD./2012 DATED 25. 3.2014 THE SIX MONTHS PERIOD IS TO BE RECKONED FROM THE END OF THE MONTH IN WHICH THE TRANSFER OF CAPITAL ASSET TOOK PLACE. 8. ON THE OTHER HAND THE LD. D.R. HAS RELIED UPON THE FINDINGS OF THE LOWER AUTHORITIES THAT THE SIX MONTH PERIOD IN THIS CASE ENDED ON 01.03.2006 AND THAT THE BONDS WERE PURCHASED ON 27.03.06. HENCE THE B ENEFIT OF SECTION 54EC WAS NOT AVAILABLE TO THE ASSESSEE. 9. WE HAVE HEARD THE RIVAL CONTENTIONS OF THE LD. R EPRESENTATIVES OF BOTH THE PARTIES AND HAVE ALSO GONE THROUGH THE RECORDS. THE ASSESSEE HAS RELIED UPON THE DECISION OF THE SPECIAL BENCH OF THE TRIBU NAL IN THE CASE OF ALKABEN B. PATEL (SUPRA) WHEREIN IT HAS BEEN HELD THAT TH E PROVISIONS OF SECTION 54EC BEING BENEFICIAL PROVISION THE WORD MONTHLY OCCU RRING IN THE PROVISION SHOULD BE CONSTRUED AS A CALENDAR MONTH AND NOT IN BETWEEN AND THE RELEVANT ITA NO.4529/M/2012 SMT. LADMIBAI M. PALIWAL 4 DATE SHOULD BE TAKEN AS THE LAST DATE OF THE MONTH FROM THE MONTH IN WHICH THE TRANSFER TOOK PLACE. THE RELEVANT FINDINGS OF THE S PECIAL BENCH FOR THE SAKE OF REFERENCE ARE REPRODUCED AS UNDER: 5.3 WE HAVE DULY ANALYZED THIS ARGUMENT. THE TERM 'MONT H' IS NOT DEFINED IN THE INCOME TAX ACT THEREFORE SEEKING TH E HELP OF AN ANOTHER STATUTE HENCE EXAMINED THE TERM 'MONTH' AS PER GEN ERAL CLAUSES ACT 1897 WHICH SAYS- 'SECTION 3 DEFINES - (35) 'MONTH' SHALL MEAN A MONTH RECKONED ACCORDING TO TH E BRITISH CALENDAR. IT MAY NOT BE OUT OF PLACE TO MENTION THAT IN SECTI ON 54E 54EA AND 54EB THE PHRASE IS IDENTICAL I.E. 'WITHIN A PERIOD OF SIX MONTHS AFTER THE DATE OF SUCH TRANSFER'. WE HAVE BEEN INFORMED THAT THIS PHRASE O THERWISE IS NOT USED BY THE LEGISLATOR IN ANY OTHER PROVISIONS OF IT ACT 1961 OR IT RULE 1982. WHICH MEANS A SPECIFIC PERIOD IS PRESCRIBED FOR THE PURPO SE OF INVESTMENT IN CERTAIN SPECIFIED ASSETS IN RESPECT OF COMPUTATION OF CAPITAL GAIN. MEANING THEREBY AN INCENTIVE IS PRESCRIBED BY THE STATUTE TO A TAX PAYER WHO HAS EARNED LONG TERM CAPITAL GAIN TO GET RELIEF IF INVEST THE GAIN IN ANY OF THE SPECIFIED ASSET. BUT THE INVESTMENT HAS TO BE MADE AT ANY TIME WITHIN A PERIOD OF SIX MONTHS AFTER THE DATE OF SUCH TRANSFER. 5.4 BEING A BENEFICIAL PROVISION THROUGH WHICH AN INCEN TIVE IS GIVEN AN ARGUMENT HAS BEEN RAISED THAT SUCH PROVISION SHOUL D BE INTERPRETED LIBERALLY. FOR THIS LEGAL PROPOSITION OF LIBERAL INTERPRETATIO N DECISIONS CITED ARE NAMELY BAJAJ TEMPO LTD. VS. CIT 196 ITR 188 (SC) CIT VS. GWALIOR RAVAN SILK MANUFACTURING COMPANY 196 ITR 149 (SC) AND CI T VS VEGETABLE PRODUCTS LTD. 88 ITR 192 (SC). EVEN IT HAS ALSO BE EN ARGUED THAT THE HIGHEST REVENUE AUTHORITY I.E. CBDT HAS ALSO TAKEN DUE CO GNIZANCE OF SUCH INCENTIVE PROVISIONS THEREFORE GRANTED RELAXATION . SUCH AS IN CBDT CIRCULAR NO.794 DATED 9 OF AUGUST 2000; CBDT CIRCULAR NO.35 9 DATED 10 TH OF MAY 1983 AND CIRCULAR NO.791 DATED 2'' OF JUNE 2000. C ERTAIN TRIBUNALS HAVE ALSO ACCEPTED THE LEGAL ASPECT OF LIBERAL INTE RPRETATION' OF STATUTE IN RESPECT OF PROVISIONS OF SECTION 54E OR SECTIONS 54EA SUCH AS IN THE CASE OF MAHESH NEINCHANDRA GANESHWADE VS. ITO 17 ITR (TRIB UNAL) 116 (PUIIE) BHIKHULAL CHANDAK (HUE) VS. ITO 126 TTJ 345 (NAGPU R) CHANCHAL KUMAR SIRKAR VS. ITO (2012) 16 ITR (TRIBUNAL) 91 (KOLKATA). WE ARE IN AGREEMENT WITH THIS LEGAL PROPOSITION BEING LAID DOWN BY THE HON'BLE COURTS B UT TO RESOLVE THIS CONTROVERSY WE FEEL THAT A LITTLE MORE DELIBERATION IS REQUIRED INSTEAD OF DECIDING ONLY ON THE BASIS OF THIS THUMB-RULE. 5.5 WHILE DEALING WITH THIS TYPE OF INCENTIVE PROVI SIONS WE MAY LIKE TO MENTION THAT IT IS NEITHER A QUESTION OF 'LIBERAL I NTERPRETATION OF STATUTE' OR A 'LITERAL INTERPRETATION OF STATUTE' BUT IT IS A MATTER OF 'PURPOSIVE CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTE' OR 'CONSTRUCTIVE INTERPRET ATION OF STATUTE'. A TRUE ITA NO.4529/M/2012 SMT. LADMIBAI M. PALIWAL 5 INTENTION OF THE ENACTMENT IS REQUIRED TO BE CONSID ERED BY A COURT OF LAW. IN THE PRESENT CASE THE INTENTION IS TO ATTRACT INVES TMENT TO BE USED FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF INFRASTRUCTURE ETC. THE QUESTION AS TO WHETHER A STATUTE IS MANDATORY OR DIRECTORY DEPENDS UPON THE INTENT OF THE LEGISLATOR AND NOT UPON THE LANGUAGE IN WHICH IT IS CLOTHED. THE MEANING AN D INTENTION OF THE LEGISLATOR IS TO JUDGED BY THE LANGUAGE BUT THESE ARE TO BE CONSIDERED NOT ONLY FROM PHRASEOLOGY OF THE PROVISION BUT ALSO BY CONSIDERING ITS NATURE ITS DESIGN AND THE CONSEQUENCES WHICH WOULD FOLLOW FRO M CONSTRUING IT THE ONE WAY OR THE OTHER. THEREFORE WE HAVE EXAMINED THE GENERAL CLAUSES ACT 1 897 WHERE THE 'MONTH' SHALL MEAN 'A MONTH RECKONED ACCO RDING TO BRITISH CALENDAR'. THIS CONTROVERSY HAS EARLIER BEEN ADDRES SED BY CERTAIN HIGHER FORUM AND THEN IT WAS DECIDED THAT THE QUESTION WHETHER 'MONT H' MEANS A 'LUNAR MONTH' OR A 'CALENDAR MONTH' WOULD DEPEND ON INTENTION FOR TH E USAGE OF THE TERNI MONTH'. IN BRITISH CALENDAR A MONTH IS A UNIT OF PE RIOD USED IN A CALENDAR. IT MAY NOT BE OUT OF CONTEXT TO MENTION THAT THIS SYSTEM WAS I NVENTED BY MESOPOTAMIA. AN AVERAGE LENGTH OF A MONTH IS 29.53 DAYS; BUT IN A CALENDAR YEAR THERE ARE 7 MONTHS WITH 31 DAYS 4 MONTHS HAVING 30 DAYS AND ON E MONTH HAS 28/29 DAYS. IT CAN BE POSSIBLE THAT UNDER COMMON PARLANCE PROBABLY IT MEANT A LUNAR MONTH BUT IN CALCULATING THE SPECIFIED NUMBER OF MONTHS THAT HAD ELAPSED AFTER OCCURRENCE OF A SPECIFIED EVENT THEN A GENERAL RULE IS THAT THE PER IOD OF A MONTH ENDS ON THE LAST DAY. THEREFORE A MONTH ENDS BY THE LAST DATE OF TH AT MONTH. ONE OF THE ITAT BENCH MUMBAI IN THE CASE OF YAHYA E. DHARIWALA 49 SOT 458 (MUNI) HAS ALSO OPINED THAT QUOTE 'SIX MONTHS PERIOD SHOULD BE RECK ONED FROM THE END OF THE MONTH IN WHICH THE TRANSFER TAKES PLACE 'UNQUOTE. T HEREAFTER IN THE CASE OF AQUATECH ENGINEERS 36 CCH 167 (MUM TRIB.) AGAIN I T WAS DECIDED TO GRANT THE EXEMPTION OF INVESTMENT U/S.54EC IF THE SAME HAS BE EN MADE BY THE END OF THE MONTH. 5.6 IN CERTAIN OTHER CONTEXT FEW HON'BLE HIGH COURT S HAVE ALSO TAKEN A VIEW THAT A MONTH IS TO BE RECKONED ACCORDI NG 'BRITISH CALENDAR'. WE HAVE NOTED THAT IN THE CASE OF CIT VS. SLM MANIKIAL INDUSTRIES 274 ITR 485 THE HON'BLE JURISDICTIONAL HIGH COURT HAS OPIN ED THAT THE ISSUE OF INTERPRETATION OF THE TERM 'MONTH' IS NO L ONGER RES INTEGRA BECAUSE IN THE CASE OF CIT VS. KADRI MILLS (CAINIBATORE LTD.) 106 ITR 846 (MADRAS) IT WAS LAID DOWN THAT THE MONTH TO BE RECKONED ACCORDING T O BRITISH CALENDAR. THE ISSUE BEFORE THE HON'BLE COURT WAS THAT WHETHER THE TRIBUNAL WAS RIGHT IN LAW AND ON FACTS IN CANCELING THE PENALTY LEVIED U/ S. 271(1)(A) OBSERVING THAT MONTH MEANT CALENDAR MONTH AND NOT THE LUNAR MONTH OF 28 OR 30 DAYS. THIS ISSUE WAS DEALT AT SOME LENGTH BY HON'BLE MADRAS HI GH COURT IN THE CASE OF CIT VS. KADRI MILL CAINIBATORE LTD. 106 ITR 846 (MAD.). IN THIS CASE THE OBSERVATION OF THE HON'BLE COURT WAS THAT IT ACT 1961 ITSELF DOES NOT DEFINE THE WORD 'MONTH' HOWEVER SECTION 3 OF GENERAL CLAUSES ACT 1987 DEFI NE THE WORD 'MONTH' MEANS A MONTH RECKONED ACCORDING TO BRITISH CALENDA R. IN THIS CONTEXT A ITA NO.4529/M/2012 SMT. LADMIBAI M. PALIWAL 6 DECISION OF HON'BLE CALCUTTA HIGH PRONOUNCED IN THE CASE OF BRIJIAL LOHIA & MAHABIR PRASAD KHEMKA 124 ITR 485 HAS ALSO BEEN GENERALLY CITED WHEREIN IT WAS HELD THAT THE WORDS 'HOWEVER CONSIDERING MONTH DURING WHICH THE DEFAULT CONTINUED' AS APPEARED IN SECTION 271(L)(A) REFER O NLY TO A MONTH DURING THE WHOLE OF WHICH THE DEFAULT CONTINUED AND NOT TO A M ONTH DURING WHICH ONLY PART OF WHICH DEFAULT CONTINUED. LIKEWISE IN THE CA SE OF HARNAND RAI RAMANAND 159 ITR 988 (RAJ.) AND B.V.ASWATHAIAH & BR OTHERS 155 ITR 422( KAR.) IT WAS HELD THAT A MONTH IS A BRITISH CA LENDAR MONTH 6. THE SUBTLE QUESTION IS THAT WHETHER THE WORD 'MO NTH' REFERS IN THIS SECTION A PERIOD OF 30 DAYS OR IT REFERS TO THE MON THS ONLY. SECTION 54EC IF WE READ AGAIN PRESCRIBES THAT AN INVESTMENT IS REQUIRE D TO BE MADE WITHIN A PERIOD OF SIX MONTHS. WHETHER THE INTENTION OF THE LEGISLATOR WAS TO COMPUTE SIX CALENDAR MONTHS OR TO COMPUTE 180 DAYS. TO RESO LVE THIS CONTROVERSY WE ARE GUIDED BY A DECISION OF HON'BLE ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT PRONOUNCED IN THE CASE OF MUNNALAL SHRI KISHAN MAINPURI 167 ITR 415 WHERE ANSWERING THE DISPUTE IN RESPECT OF LAW OF LIMITATION THE HON'BLE COURT HAS CLEARLY HELD THAT THERE IS NOTHING IN THE CONTEXT OF SECTION 256(2) T O WARRANT THE CONCLUSION THAT THE WORD 'MONTH' IN IT REFERS TO A PERIOD OF 30 DAYS T HEREFORE REFERS TO SIX MONTHS IN SECTION 256(2) IS TO SIX CALENDAR MONTHS AND NOT 180 DAYS. RATHER IN THIS CITED DECISION AN INTERESTING OBSERVATION O F THE COURT WAS THAT WHILE COMPARING THE PRECEDENTS THE CONTEXTUAL SETTING IS TO BE EXAMINED AND IF ENTIRELY DISTINCT AND DIFFERENT THEN DO NOT WARRANT TO APPLY UNIVERSALLY. EVEN IN THE CASE OF TAMAL LAHIRI VS. KUMAR P. N. TAGORE 19 78 AIR 1811/1979 SCC (1) 75 IT WAS OPINED WHILE INTERPRETING SECTION 533 OF BAN GALORE MUNICIPAL ACT 1932 THAT THE EXPRESSION SIX MONTHS IN THE SAID SEC TION MEANS SIX CALENDAR MONTHS AND NOT 180 DAYS. A COPY OF THE JUD GMENT IS PLACED BEFORE US. THE PURPOSE OF MENTIONING THIS PLANK OF ARGUMENT IS THAT AFTER SCRUTINIZING FEW MORE SECTIONS OF THE ACT IT IS EVIDENT THAT ON SOME OCCASION THE LEGISLATURE HAD NOT USED THE TERMS 'MO NTH' BUT USED THE NUMBER OF DAYS TO PRESCRIBE A SPECIFIC PERIOD. FOR EXAMPLE IN SECTION 254(2A) FIRST PROVISO IT IS PRESCRIBED THAT THE TRIBUNAL MAY PASS AN ORDER GRANTING STAY BUT FOR A PERIOD NOT EXCEEDING ONE HUNDRED AND EIGH TY DAYS. THIS IS AN IMPORTANT DISTINCTION MADE IN THIS STATUTE WHILE SUBSCRIBING THE LIMITATION/ PERIOD. THIS DISTINCTION THUS RESOLVES THE PRESENT CONTROVE RSY BY ITSELF. 7. SO THE LOGICAL CONCLUSION IS THAT IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY DEFINITION OF THE WORD ' MONTH' IN THE ACT THE DEFINITION OF GENERAL CLAUSES ACT 1897 SHALL BE APPLICABLE AND BY DOING SO THERE IS N O ATTEMPT ON OUR PART TO INTERPRET THE LANGUAGE OF SEC. 54EC WHAT TO SAY A LIBERAL OR LITERAL INTERPRETATION. WE HEREBY HOLD THAT THE LEGISLATURE HAS IN ITS WISDOM HAS CHOSEN TO USE THE WORD 'MONTH'. THIS WAS DONE BY KE EPING IN MIND THE DEFINITION AS PRESCRIBED IN GENERAL CLAUSES ACT 1857. THEREFOR E WE HAVE ALSO READ THE WORD 'MONTH' WITHIN THE RECOGNIZED WAYS OF INTERPRE TATION. RATHER WE HAVE ALSO SEEN BOTH; THE CONVENTIONAL AS WELL AS LEXICON MEANING. HERE THERE IN NO ATTEMPT TO SUPPLY CASUS- OLNISSUS BUT REPLICATED AS PER THE LANGUAGE USED. ITA NO.4529/M/2012 SMT. LADMIBAI M. PALIWAL 7 7.1 IN THE PRESENT CASE THERE IS NO DISPUTE ABOUT T HE INVESTMENT WHICH HAD ACTUALLY BEEN MADE BY THE ASSESSEE. THE SAID INVEST MENT HAD BEEN MADE IN THE MONTH OF DECEMBER 2008. HOWEVER ALLEG ED TO BE FEW DAYS LATE FROM THE DATE OF TRANSFER IN THE MONTH OF JUNE 2008. IT IS NOT THE CASE OF THE REVENUE THAT THE APPELLANT HAD ALTOGETHER FUDGED TH E DATES. ONCE THE PURPOSE OF THE INTRODUCTION OF THE SECTION WAS SERVED BY MAKIN G THE INVESTMENT IN THE SPECIFIED ASSETS THEN THAT PURPOSE HAS TO BE KEPT I N MIND WHILE GRANTING INCENTIVE. 7.2 WE HEREBY HOLD THAT THE INVESTMENT IN QUESTION QUALIFIES FOR THE DEDUCTION U/S 54EC. RESULTANTLY ASSESSEE'S GROUNDS ARE HEREBY ALLOWED. THE QUESTION REFERRED IS ANSWERED IN FAVOUR OF THE ASSE SSEE. 10. RESPECTFULLY FOLLOWING THE ORDER OF THE CO-ORDI NATE BENCH WE HOLD ACCORDINGLY AND THE IMPUGNED ORDER OF THE LOWER AUT HORITY IS SET ASIDE AND THE APPEAL OF THE ASSESSEE IS HEREBY ALLOWED . ORDER PRONOUNCED IN THE OPEN COURT ON 31.07.2015. SD/- SD/- (G.S. PANNU) (SANJAY GARG) ACCOUNTANT MEMBER JUDICIAL MEMBER MUMBAI DATED: 31.07.2015. * KISHORE SR. P.S. COPY TO: THE APPELLANT THE RESPONDENT THE CIT CONCERNED MUMBAI THE CIT (A) CONCERNED MUMBAI THE DR CONCERNED BENCH //TRUE COPY// [ BY ORD ER DY/ASSTT. REGISTRAR ITAT MUMBAI.